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Plaintiffs consider a Reply Brief necessary ~r, 
appropriate in this particular case. The format of this Reply 
Brief in Sections A-E below will be such as to specifically 
address the arguments referenced in Respondents' Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Resoonse to defendants' Point IA, D and E: The 
lower court failed to properly interprec 
§ 10-9-15, Utah Code Ann. (1953) and applied an 
erroneous standard of review. 
Point IA, D and E of Defendants' Brief asserts thctt 
§ 10-9-15, Utah Code Ann. (1953) requires the district court to 
apply an appellate standard of review and presume the validity 
of the Board of Adjustment's decision. Defendants' entire 
argument is made without any reference to the actual wording of 
§ 10-9-15, Utah Code Ann. (1953). The argument relies entirely 
upon a zoning treatise and cases wherein there was either no 
statute providing specifically for a cause of action or review 
for a person aggrieved by a zoning decision or the statute in 
question limited the scope of review in the courts. 
Defendants' argument, then, seeks to substitute 
general zoning concepts in contravention of the express inteot 
of the legislature reflected in § 10-9-15, Utah Code Ann, 
(1953), that aggrieved persons have a "plenary action fee 
relief." Defendants in essence are asking this Court tc 
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_ ,, s' ,,_ i ''oely eradicate the words "plenary action" from the 
·::i..atut e. 
Defendants' reliance upon the zoning authority and 
cases they cite are misplaced and the authorities themselves 
,re used out of context. For example, defendants rely upon 
coruin language taken out of context from McQuillin's work on 
corporations. (Res. Br. P· 10). Defendants, 
however, fail to reference the very first sentence of the 
section guoted: 
The scope of judicial review of the 
decisions of zoning boards is, of course, 
dependent upon governing statutes, and 
usually it is broader than a determination 
of the board's jurisdiction. SA McQuillin, 
Municipal Corporations § 25.334 at p. 472 
(1976). (Emphasis added.) 
McQui llin goes on to state in the same section and 
just before the language quoted by defendants: 
C' 
' ~: ' 
But t~q extent of review and 
pactic~lar cases depends, of 
issues of fact and applicable 
before the court. Id. 
"lCJ'Jl llin, then, is really 
-'iJ )Sit i (;(l that the scope of review 













the proposition that judicial review under § 10-9-15, Utah Code 
Ann. (1953) or any similar statute is limited to an appelh•,: 
standard. McQuillin, however, is authority for the principle 
that the language of the governing statute determines the 
of review. 
Defendants also place great reliance on four Uta' 
cases: Cottonwood Heights Citizen Assoc. v. Bd. (Utah 1979); 
Gay land v. Salt Lake Count:i, 11 U.2d 307,358 P. 2d 633 ( 1961); 
Na:i:lor v. Salt Lake Citi;'. CorE·, 17 u. 2d 300, 410 p. 2d 764 
(1966); Crestview-Holladai:'. Home Owners Assoc., Inc. v. Enge. 
Floral Cor12., 545 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1976) (Res. Brief, pp. 
10-11.) These cases, however, are inapposite. Three of thesi? 
cases, Cottonwood Heights, Gay land, and Crest view-Holladay 
involve county zoning matters for which there is no statutory 
provision granting an aggrieved person an appeal, cause of 
action or right of review. Jurisdiction in each of these cases 
was presumably based on Article VIII, §§ 7 and 9 of the Utah 
Constitution1 or Rule 658(b), Utah R. Civ. P., which operates 
l In Baker v. De t. of Re istration, 3 P.2d 1082, 
1087-89 (Utah 1931 , this Court held that the district courts 
and Supreme Court have appellate jurisdiction over the 
Department of Registration, an administrative body, pursuant t•' 
the above-referenced constitutional provisions. 
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ii 1-;':IJ cJf the old common law writs. Gayland involved a claim 
inlet the Declaratory Judgment Act seeking to invalidate an 
'Jr. i j narL~"= • 
Not one of these cases involved § 10-9-15, Utah Code 
Ann. (1953) or any other statutory provision governing the 
rights of a person aggrieved by a decision of a zoning board. 
Consequently, their analysis of the scope of review and effect 
of a Board decision is not pertinent to this Court's 
determination of the meaning of § 10-9-15, Utah Code. Ann. 
( 195 3). 
The cases from other jurisdictions relied upon by 
Jdendants (Res. Br. pp. 22-24, 28) are equally inapposite. 
'.hlliams ''· Zoning Adjustment Board of the City of Laramie, 383 
P.2d 730 (Wyo. 1963) involved a statute using the words 
"reviewed" and "appeal". Obviously, an appellate scope of 
review was appropriate in that context. The remaining cases 
[r8m other jurisdictions relied upon by defendants did not 
'wolve statutory actions challenging zoning decisions. Levy 
3oar0 of Adjustment of Ar'l.oahoe County, 141 Colo. 493, 369 
~.~d 991 (1962) expressly involved a 11 certiorari-type actionu. 
f..!_. at 992. In Richard v. Fundenberger, 1 Kan. App. 222, 563 
'2j 1069 (1977) no reference at all was made to any statute 
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and presumably the claim was pursuant to a special ,irit, 
were the Utah cases relied upon by defendants. 
Defendants' attempt to rely on what they assert is a 
"universally accepted principle" (Res. Br. p. 10) that the 
scope of review of zoning decisions is extremely limited fails 
to come to grips with the essential issue in this case: DiJ 
the district court erroneously limit its scope of consideration 
of plaintiffs' "plenary action" under § 10-9-15, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953)? Defendants' entire brief is dedicated to convincing 
this Court to legislate and effectively delete the words 
"plenary action" from the statute. 
It is to no avail that defendants point out what they 
consider an anomaly, i.e., plaintiffs' position would result in 
a different standard for judicial review of decisions from city 
and county zoning boards. The anomaly, if any, is merely the 
result of the legislature's failure to provide a statutory 
mechanism for review of county zoning board decisions. This 
circumstance, however, cannot deter this Court from giving the 
term "plenary action" in § 10-9-15, Utah Code Ann. (1953) its 
plain meaning. 
Defendants' assertion that controversies before the 
Board of Adjustment are complex and inappropriate for 
consideration by the courts is not correct. The controversy 
-5-
05 ,cc··e:i in this case indicates just the opposite. The case 
complex and merely involves the application of a city 
_,c-Jirlance to the facts. This is exactly the type of 
ic:t::'lstFrnce courts deal with daily which might well make them 
oetter equipped to fairly resolve such disputes. Moreover, 
there is no issue involving separation of powers. The action 
nf the Board of Adjustment is clearly adjudicatory, not 
leg isl 3. ti ve • Dillon Cos., Inc. v. Boulder, 183 Colo. 117, 515 
P.2d 627 630 (1973). Consequently, there can be no legitimate 
ossertion that a separation ot powers issue looms. The logical 
extensirin of such an assertion is that any judicial review of 
vl'llinistrative decisions breach the separation of powers 
principle. 
a.uthor-1ty 
B. Response to defendants' Point IB: The district 
court's ruling denied plaintiffs their right to a 
plenary action. 
Defendants apparently concede that the most pertinent 
is Denver & R.G.W.R. Co. v. Public Service 
:co~.:nissi0n, 98 U. 431. 100 P.2d 552 (1940). The statute in 
~hat case referenced a.n "action 11 for "plenary review 11 which 
"s:",a ll proceed as a trial de novo and is as close to the 
s•atutory wording in issue, "plenary action", as will be found 
This Court ruled that the words "trial de novo" 
0 dded n0thing and that an action under t'.<e applicable statute 
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required a full revie1>1 of all facts and law upon the recoro 
made in the agency. 
Defendants concede that this is the proper 
interpretation of the Denver Rio Grande case. (Res. Br. 
pp. 14-15). A close reading of the case illustrates that this 
Court did not consider an action under the statute to be 
limited in scope so as to require the application of appellate 
standards. 
all facts. 
This Court instead placed emphasis on the review of 
Instead of acknowledging the pertinence of the Denver 
Rio Grande case to the instant case, defendants launch into an 
analysis of another case, Denver & R.G.W.R. Co. v. Central 
Weber Sewer Improvement District, 4 U.2d 105, 287 P.2d 884 
(1955), whose only pertinence is that the Denver and Rio Grande 
happened to be a party in that case too. The Central Weber 
case did not, as the instant case and the Denver & Rio Grande 
case, involve a statute granting an action to an aggrieved 
party. It was a proceeding under a writ. As the decision in 
Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake Countv, 555 
P.2d 281 (Utah 1976), also discussed by defendants, indicates, 
extraordinary writ proceedings are in the nature of an appeal 
and accordingly limited in scope. 
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The proceedings under § 10-9-15, Utah Code Ann. 
1 !9''1), and the statute construed in the Denver & Rio Grande 
,: 1 se are "actions" and thus constitute utilizations of the 
iistrict courts' original jurisdiction, not their appellate 
1 Jrisjiction. Consequently, they are not as limited in scope 
,s extraordinary writ proceedings. 
c. ResEonse to defendants' Point IC: The district 
court erroneously considered the record of a 
Eroceedin9 conducted over a year before the 
Eroceedin9 in issue. 
Defendants' suggest there is irony in plaintiffs' 
seeking to preclude consideration of the record before the 
8')ud in the 1980 proceeding in this plenary action. What 
o~aint1ffs sought, however, was to limit defendants to the 
cec')rd of their creation and prohibit the use of the record in 
1 proceeding conducted over 16 months before the subject Board 
proceeding which addressed issues under a completely different 
c.irlinance. 
The record in the October, 1980 proceeding was on the 
issue of home occupation. Consequently, counsel was not 
,:::011cerned about the neighbor's complaints or even his 
s-ote:nents as they were not relevant to the issue of home 
:iccu~c.. ti on. Consequently, there was not even an effort to 
-ross-exa:nine and little concern for contrary evidence. 
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Over 16 months later in March, 1982, however, 
issues had changed. Home occupation was irrelevant. 
relevant was the new ordinance and such matters as tho 
character of the neighborhood and nuisance. Plaintiffs woulJ 
have to counter adverse evidence, if any, of conditions in 
March, 1982, not conditions in October, 1980. 
There was, however, no such evidence and defendants 
knew they would have to use the October, 1980 record regardless 
of the pertinent time period being March, 
record was not used for and not necessary 
1982. This 1980 
for background as 
contended by defendants. All that was 
of neighborhood conditions in March, 
necessary was evidence 
1982. A neighbor's 
complaint concerning alleged conditions in October, 1980 was 
irrelevant and should not have been considered by the district 
court. 
Not only was the October, 1980 record irrelevant, it 
was not subject to cross-examination. Since the October, 1980 
hearing addressed only the issue of whether plaintiffs' child 
tending was a home occupation, counsel made no attempt to 
cross-examine or rebut the neighbor's complaints. Such matters 
were just irrelevant in October, 1980. Such matters were, 
however, relevant in March, 1982. It was therefore necessary 
for defendants to put on new evidence of conditions which couM 
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cc ss-exa:nined or rebutted. This defendants did not do but 
,_,1 c.,.J waited until this matter was before the district court 
and offered the October, 1980 record as an exhibit. Such a use 
o: a r-ecord truly demeans any fair concept of procedural due 
process. Administrative participants are entitled to 
cress-examine and submit rebuttal evidence. Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1970); Doe v. United States Civil Service 
~· 483 F.Supp. 539, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
Defendants suggest that the record in the Octooer, 
1980 proceeding is within the hearsay exceptions recited in 
Rule 63(16) and ( 1 7)' Utah Rules of Evidence. These 
exceptions, '1owever, must be considered in the context of the 
proceeding in question. The proceedings were taped and a 
report of the content was made. 
1eflect what was said and by whom. 
This report purports to 
The report concludes with 
the only determination made by the Board, i.e., "that the 
tending of children is not a home occupation." There were no 
other deter-minations by the board and all further references in 
tc_e meeting report are evidence, not facts. Rule 63(16) limits 
its applicability to facts and is therefore inapplicable. 
Rule 6 3 ( 1 7) is not applicable to records such as ths 
Q1e in issue which is a substitute for a transcript of 
The rule was intended to admit official records 
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illustrating official actions or findings. It cou 1 d no I_ he 
been intended to allow the use in court of transcri 
substitutes which are otherwise not admissible under ~ 1 • 
63(3). which is applicable to depositions and prior testimony. 
Otherwise, the Utah Rules of Evidence would make a mockery of 
the concepts of right, opportunity and motivation for 
cross-examination as stated in Rule 63(3). 
Try as they may, defendants have failed to justify tee 
use of the record in the October, 1980 proceeding. The issues 
in the October, 1980 proceeding were different than those ic. 
the March, 1982 proceeding which was the only proceeding before 
the district court. Whatever background that was necessary, if 
any, was recited in the later, March, 1982, proceeding. (Pl. 
Ex. 1.) Plaintiffs did not have any reason to cross-examine or 
rebut the October, 1980 evidence in the context of the 
different issues which were eventually presented in the March, 
1982 proceeding. Moreover, there was no evidence that the 
alleged conditions in the 







proceedings as evidence before ~he district 
October, 1980 
October, 193S 
court of the 
matters addressed in the March, 1982 proceeding violate a11; 
concept of fundamental fairness, regardless of the scope of toe 
district court's consideration. 
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D. Response to defendants' Point II: Irreqular1ties 
in the proceedings before the Board, individually 
and in the aggregate, warrant reversal. 
Defendants suggest that plaintiffs have waived 
,,, 0 ,Jrng to oppose the decision of the district court for the 
rea 3 on that pl3.intiffs objected to the court's adoption of the 
slar1te<l findings proposed by defendants themselves. (Res. Br. 
29-30.) After the parties were informed of the ruling of 
the iistrict court, defendants submitted proposed findings 
xr.1c:n were sl3.nted, weighted entirely in defendants' favor and 
ioc~ude,i matters which CO'-.Jld not have even been decided if the 
-:curt 't-1ere truly to apply an appellate standard. (R. 
i21-130.) Plaintiff opposed entry of the findings on the 
irounds that Rule 52(a), Utah R. Civ. P., limited the use of 
!1nj1ngs and conclusions to "actions tried upon the facts 
'"'hout 3. jury." ( R. 112-113.) 
Plaintiffs asserted then and submit now that 
clefen1ants' attempt to have the court adopt its slanted 
i:" .. i'c:: d3.S inconsistent with its position, adopted by the 
1lstr 1 ct court, that this matter was an appellate proceeding. 
'.'c'.eri<rnts •,;ere just overreaching and the district court would 
~lLow findings when, in accordance with defendants' own 
:oeo.cry, therr: was not an "action tried upon the facts without a 
3.S contemplated by Rule 52 (a), Utah R. Civ. P. 
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Consequently, the court did not need to pass point by poic• 
defendants' proposed findings. 
There is no reason to repeat the arguments concernh: 
the insufficiency of the evidence and irregularities at th; 
March and April, 1982 proceedings. (App. Br. pp. 27-31.) 
Nevertheless, some minor reference is necessary to the numberec 
items raised in defendants' brief. (Res. Br. pp. 30-38.) 
1. Defendants seek to dismiss the Board's 
publication referencing plaintiffs' proposal as a "preschocl 
center", rather than accurately calling it a "home day care 
service" on the grounds that it was a clerical error. 
Regardless of the type of error, a reading of the letters ot 
two neighbors, who were not at the meeting to hear defendants' 
retraction, indicates that they were thinking of a substa~tial 
enterprise, a "preschool center". (Thomson and Stocki no 
letters contained in P. Ex. 1.) The Board actually referred to 
these letters as being adverse to plaintiffs' application (PJ. 
Ex. 1 and Ex. 2 to Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, R. 54-55). The resulting prejudice is 
verified by the Board's 
the plaintiffs' must 
express view that applications such as 
be denied if there is opposition. 
(Findings and Order, pp. 1-2, 3, 4, contained in Pl. Ex. 1: and 
Ex. 2 to Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary 
-13-
''1 l 'JrJi,' t 1 ()r1, R. 53-54, 55' 56.) The Board, then, by 
.:d~• r,1:~cter1zing the application, aided in creating the very 
appusit1on upon which it based its denial of plaintiffs' 
;::,;lol icat ion. 
2. Defendants assert that there was no reason for 
the Board to inspect the property and activities in question 
oeyond a "windshield viewing." The defendants are thereby 
saying that they need not view the very activities in question, 
the activities which they characterize as a nuisance with no 
evidentiary support. 
3. Defendants' arguments concerning ·the Board's 
finding that the neighborhood is 
people is particularly telling. 
composed of many elderly 
Defendants refer to "the 
oppearance of the ten individuals that had appeared before the 
Board in the various hearings." (Res. Br. p. 31.) In order to 
come up with the number ten, the defendants had to utilize some 
fancy mathematics which is not supported by the record. Not 
e?en the rec-:>rd of the October, 1980 proceeding combined with 
'he '.Jroceeding in issue illustrates the age of the peop~e 
coj~cting, their numoer or any other fact which establishes 
'hat a total of ten elderly individuals had appeared in two 




.J1cate, a counting of the number and age of those objecting 
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cannot support a finding by the Board that the neighborhoc-'~ , 
composed of many elderly people. All it could establish j, 
that those objecting were elderly. 
Defendants' other argument concerning the character of 
the neighborhood is that plaintiffs' offered no evidence tha: 
the neighborhood is ~ predominantly elderly. There is a good 
reason why such evidence was not offered: plaintiffs had no 
idea this was even an issue. The only reference to age or 
elderly nature of the neighborhood in the entire record is 
contained in the order section of the Board's Findings and 
Conclusions (Pl. Ex. 1) and in the record referring to t~ 
motion to deny the application (R. 64). These two references 
are stated as grounds supporting the motion and order to deny 
plaintiffs' application. Certainly this Court cannot hoLJ 
plaintiffs to a standard which penalizes them for failure to 
disprove the elderly nature of the neighborhood when it was not 
until a motion to deny the application was made that the firs\ 
reference to age and the composition of the neighborhood wos 
made. The proceedings were over seconds later when the motion, 
passed. 
Defendants' attempt to respond to plaintiffs' 
argument that the Board merely denied the application because 
there was some opposition is best characterized by their own 
statement: 
-15-
':'he ~lleged tainting impact of one isolated 
''tatement in a lengthy proceeding spanning 
two meetings was properly ruled by the lower 
court not to be determinative and not proved 
ccorrect by appellant Jorgensen. (Res. Br. 
p. 3 3.) 
The ':ourt should accept defendants' challenge, read the record 
cf the proceedings and see that four references are made to the 
f 3.''°: t of opposition and absence of support as being 
1e:er:ninative. .".. reading of the entire record will indicate 
tr.at this case was determined by the fact of some opposition 
•nd the concept that the Board allowed a few but loud opponents 
to dictate the outcome. 
5. Defendants make reference to some items that they 
contend provide record evidence supporting its finding of 
:--~ 1Jisaf'.Ce. (Res. Br. p. 33.) It should be noted that no 
ref9 re nee is made to the record. For most of the items listed 
:here is no supporting evidence in the record. For those items 
•here there is support, it should be noted that reference must 
'-- ~cile to the earlier proceeding of October, 1982 where the 
home occupation. Other items referenced by 
:e:~;-i('l;:ints, such as the existence of a winding street, are not 
':r...1~ t relevant to a nuisance cl:i.~rn. 
6. Defendants appropriately indicate that under the 
two independent concepts must exist before an 
-16-
application should be granted: the absence of evi Je 
indicating (a) change in character of the neighborhood and It· 
nuisance. (Res. Br. p. 34.) Defendants then argue that age is 
appropriate in considering the character of the neighbor'noc,< 
but that age should not be considered in analyzing nuisance 
under the standard of the hypothetical reasonable person. 
The inconsistency of defendants' position suggests 
that the character of the neighborhood under the ordinance is 
not determined by the type of people living there (age, race, 
sex, etc.). Instead the character of the neighborhood should 
be analyzed in the context of the type of activity for which 
application is made. Thus, it would be i;nportant to consider 
that plaintiffs' application was for home day care of five 
children in addition to her own preschooler. It was not an 
application for a preschool center as the Board stated in its 
published notice. It would also be important to consider sucn 
things as the location of a church and large p'l.rking l~t 
abutting plaintiffs' property to the south. 2 The Boud, 
however, did not consider such things in determining whetr.e: 
there would be a change in the character of the neighborhood. 
2 This is established by the 
property which is a part of the record. 
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survey of plaintiffs 
E. Conclusion. 
Defendants have failed to adequately address the 
saeclf1c and more significant irregularities that occurred 
along the path of this matter. Plaintiffs in this Reply Brief 
~ve attempted to respond to only those points of some singular 
significance. Nevertheless, it is important that this case be 
considered by the Court as a whole. Each of the irregularities 
must be viewed as an integral part of the entire case. In this 
way, it will be seen that fundamental fairness, both procedural 
and substantive, was lacking. In this context it is most 
appropriate to give the statutory term "plenary action" its 
plain meaning. If given the opportunity to truly pursue their 
express statutory right of a plenary action, unimpeded by a 
standard of limited appellate review, plaintiffs will only be 
afforded that which the legislature intended. The result, 
however, will be a decision on the merits, not a decision 
tainted by the irregularities before the Board. 
Respectfully submitted 
this 13th day of January, 1984 
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